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1. Introduction
Policies often involve interventions that spillover across units and generate indirect effects. These effects,
which occur when an agent’s treatments indirectly affect other agents’ outcomes through different types of
interference, are pervasive in many economic and social contexts (Cox, 1958). Understanding the mechanism
of interference is therefore crucial for the optimal design of an intervention, because it allows to leverage
or reduce spillover effects and improve the overall policy effectiveness (Moffitt, 2001). This is, for example,
the case when contrasting criminal involvement (Glaeser et al., 1996), improving immigrants’ access to labor
market (Beaman, 2012), providing financial education (Bursztyn et al., 2014; Cai et al., 2015), and designing
health programs (Miguel et al., 2004), managerial incentive systems (Bandiera et al., 2009), or retirement
plans (Duflo and Saez, 2003).1
Broad-based policy experimentation represents the ideal framework to develop a rigorous evaluation of an
intervention (Athey & Imbens, 2017), and a large array of cleverly designed experiments have been developed
to deal with the issue of interference (see Baird et al., 2018, for a recent review).2 However, more than often
the only viable option to assess a policy effectiveness is through the analysis of observational data. In these
cases, the existing impact evaluation methodologies (e.g., the propensity score matching (PSM), Rosenbaum
& Rubin, 1983; Dehejia et al., 2002), which rely on the assumption that an agent’s treatment does not spill
over on to other agents,3 largely neglect the existence of interference.
In this paper, we present one of the first efforts to evaluate policy interventions in the presence of
interference using observational data. Our proposed methodology aims to: i) produce unbiased estimates of
the policy impact by correcting for the bias resulting from both treatment selection and interference, and ii)
quantify both direct and spillover effects of the treatment.
We provide a general formalization of the issue under the potential-outcomes framework, by developing
a joint propensity score (JPS) for the estimation of treatment and spillover effects in observational data. In
doing so, we assume that spillover effects are mediated through a network structure (Jackson et al., 2017).
This allows us to identify how the agent’s treatment has also an effect on another agent, track the pattern
of policy diffusion in the network4, and conceive each agent as subject to two treatments, namely: the
individual treatment and the network treatment. The latter is the agent’s exposure to the treatments of
1Or also, encouraging schooling attendance (Lalive et al., 2009) and responding to trade restrictions (Giordani et al., 2016).
2The theoretical foundations often employed by this literature have been laid by Hudgens & Halloran (2008), and further
developed by Liu & Hudgens (2013), Tchetgen Tchetgen & VanderWeele (2012), and Baird et al. (2018), who approached the
estimation of spillover effects using two-stage randomization designs. In a later refinement, Leung (2019) provided a framework
to account for interference when conveyed by a single social network.
3This is also called Individualistic Treatment Response (ITR) assumption (Manski, 2013), and combined with the unique
treatment assumption is referred to as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1980).
4This is also the case of Banerjee et al. (2013), who employed social network data to identify best practices for the diffusion
of a microfinance program in India.
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neighborhood agents. Causal estimation of these effects is then obtained by balancing individual and network
characteristics across agents under different levels of the individual and network treatments. The foundation
of this approach rests upon the work by Forastiere et al. (2020), who were among the first to tackle the issue
of interference in observational network data and causal inference. With respect to that study, a key novelty
of this paper is represented by the source of treatment considered. While Forastiere et al. (2020) proposes a
method to study binary treatments, here we consider a continuous treatment at both individual and network
level. Moreover, our method allows to model different degree of exposures to spillover effects, by considering
both symmetric or asymmetric network connections, and those characterized by heterogeneous intensities.
The methodology developed in this paper is illustrated through the investigation of policy effectiveness
in agricultural markets. Policy interventions in these markets provide an ideal case-study for the analysis
interference for two main reasons. First, these interventions are not randomly distributed, leading to a
potential treatment selection bias. Second, they can significantly interfere with one another because of the
emerging interconnections of the agri-food international networks (Johnson & Noguera, 2017; Balie´ et al.,
2018). In this context, our method allows to assess the impact of a policy while correcting for potential biases
resulting from both treatment selection and interference. In addition, it allows to model the non-discrete
nature of the treatment, accounting for the heterogeneous intensity of policy interventions, which differ from
country to country and over time. The potential spillover effects of national policies in agricultural markets
have represented a matter of interest for academics and policy makers since the 2008 food crisis, when riots
erupted in many developing countries, and it is currently highly debated during the COVID-19 crisis, as some
countries are resorting to restrict their exports in order to ensure adequate domestic supplies.5 Contributing
to this emerging debate, we show that agricultural policies have indirect effects which significantly interfere
with those implemented by commercial partners.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by introducing a new framework to deal with interference
in observational studies, it contributes to the vast literature on impact evaluation techniques (for a review,
see Sacerdote, 2014; Athey & Imbens, 2017). Second, it proposes an innovative approach to properly frame
the role of network structures in causal inference, which is still very much debated in both economic and
network analysis (Doreian, 2001; Arpino et al., 2017). Third, it provides new insights into the optimal design
of agricultural policies in the presence of non-negligible spillover effects.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the JPS estimator. In Section
5As reported by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (Glauber et al., 2020): on March 2020 Russia,
the world’s second largest exporter of cereals, has already implemented a ban on its export of processed grains. Soon after,
Kazakhstan, Thailand, and Cambodia followed suit and Vietnam, the world’s third largest exporter of rice, put a moratorium
on new export contracts.
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3, we present an empirical application of this method to investigate spillover effects in agricultural markets.
Finally, Section 4 concludes and draws policy implications.
2. Methodology
In this section we introduce the notation and main assumptions of our analytical setting. First, we assume
that agents are embedded in a network; that is, the agents are represented by nodes and the diffusion channel
through which the treatments interfere with one another, mediating spillover effects, is identified by a link.
In other words, i and j are connected through a link if treatment on an agent has also an effect on the other
agent. This network can be represented by the adjacency matrix A, with element ai j being a continuous
value on the realm of positive real numbers registering exposure of agent j to treatment of agent i.6
Then, let the network be composed of N nodes. For each node i, we define a partition of the set of nodes
N as (i,Ni,N−i). The set Ni is referred to as the neighborhood of agent i, which has cardinality Ni and
contains all nodes j directly connected to i. The number of neighbors Ni is referred to as the degree centrality
of agent i for consistency with the literature on social networks (see e.g., Jackson (2010)). Similarly, the set
N−i contains all nodes other than i that are not in Ni.
We now denote by Yi ∈ Y the observed outcome for agent i, and by Y the corresponding vector. We
assume that Yi is subject to two treatments. The former is the individual treatment for agent i, denoted
by the continuous variable Zi ∈Z , for which the corresponding vector is Z. The latter is the neighborhood
treatment, denoted by Gi, which is the individual treatment received by other agents in Ni and to which i is
indirectly exposed. For each unit i, the object (i,Ni,N−i) defines the following partitions of the treatment
and outcome vectors: (Zi,ZNi ,ZN−i) and (Yi,YNi ,YN−i).
Finally, Xindi ∈X ind defines the vector of Kind individual-level covariates for agent i; for instance, i’s
economic and social characteristics. Similarly, Xneighi ∈X neigh denotes the vector of Kneigh neighborhood co-
variates for agent i. This may include two types of i’s neighborhood-level covariates: i) variables representing
the structure of the neighborhood Ni (e.g. the degree Ni, the centrality, the reciprocity, the topology, etc.),
and ii) variables representing the composition of the neighborhood Ni (i.e., aggregational characteristics
summarizing individual attributes of nodes j).7 Xindi and X
neigh
i are then combined into the vector Xi ∈X
composed by K = Kind +Kneigh covariates, which represents the set of all exogenous pre-treatment variables
for agent i.
6Observe that in this framework, connections can be defined both by a social or a spatial criterion.
7Specifically, this function takes the form of hi(XindNi ), where X
ind
Ni
is a |X ind |×Ni-matrix collecting all the neighbors’ individual
covariates and hi(·) is a function hi : (X ind)Ni →Hi summarizing the matrix XindNi into a vector of dimension |Hi|< |X ind |×Ni.
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2.1. The Stable Unit Treatment on Neighborhood Value Assumption (SUTNVA)
In this section, we discuss how interference is modelled in our setting. In impact evaluation methods, it is
standard to assume that agent’s potential outcome (i.e., Yi) depends only on the agent’s own treatment; that
is, the individual treatment Z. This assumption, combined with the unique treatment assumption, is referred
to as the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin, 1980). However, under interference,
SUTVA does not hold, since agents are also exposed to the treatment received by their neighborhood; that
is, the neighborhood treatment Gi. Formally, this violation of the SUTVA requires the introduction of a new
more general assumption, which takes into account interference within the neighborhood. Accordingly, in
what follows, we propose some adjustments to the main elements constituting the SUTVA.
The first component of the SUTVA is the so-called consistency assumption (Rubin, 1980, 1986). Specif-
ically, the outcome observed at node i depends on the entire treatment assignment vector Z and can be
written as Yi(Z). As pointed out by Rubin (1986), this potential outcome is only well defined if the following
assumption holds:
Assumption 1 (No Multiple Versions of Treatment (Consistency)). The mechanism used to assign
treatments does not matter and assigning the treatments in a different way does not constitute a different
treatment.
Yi = Yi(Z)
The second component of the SUTVA is the assumption that the potential outcome of unit i only depends
on the individual treatment Zi, which rules out the presence of interference between units. In our setting, the
assumption of no interference is replaced with a new local interference assumption within the neighborhood:
Assumption 2 (First-Order Interference). The potential outcome of agent i depends on the individual
treatment (i.e., Zi) and the treatment received by connected agents (i.e., ZNi):
Yi(Z = z) = Yi(ZNi = zNi)
Assumption 2 states that interference acts only within the immediate neighborhood; that is, agent is exposed
to spillover effects generated from the treatment of direct connections in the network. Building on this idea,
we can formalize the dependence of agent i ’s outcome from the treatments received by neighboring agents
through a specific summarizing function gi :Z Ni→Gi, defined by Aronow & Samii (2017) as exposure mapping
function. Specifically, this function allows us to: i) map agent’s exposure to the treatment that spillover
across the network, and ii) identify the area of the network (i.e., the neighborhood) from which spillovers
originate (e.g. friends or commercial partners). In doing so, it can be used to disentangle the effect of the
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individual treatment from that resulting from the exposure to the treatment received by other agents located
in the neighborhood. By means of this function, we are able to introduce the following assumption:
Assumption 3 (First-Order Interference with Exposure Mapping). Given a function gi :Z Ni→Gi,
∀ZN−i ,Z ′N−i and ∀ZNi ,Z ′Ni such that gi(ZNi) = gi(Z ′Ni), the following equality holds:
Yi(Zi,ZNi ,ZN−i) = Yi(Zi,Z
′
Ni
,Z ′N−i)
In combination with Assumption 1, this is referred to as Stable Unit Treatment on Neighborhood Value
Assumption (SUTNVA) (Forastiere et al., 2020).
2.2. Potential Outcomes and Neighborhood Interference
We now define the form of the neighborhood treatment Gi, and the potential outcomes of the agents Yi.
Therefore, we make use of the exposure mapping function introduced in the previous section.
The level of treatment received by agent i from her neighbors, Gi, can be expressed through the exposure
mapping function as Gi = gi(ZNi). This implies that Gi can be either univariate or multivariate. In this
context, and without loss of generality, we consider it to be:
Gi =
1
N∑j
ai jZ j (1)
where ai j is the entry of matrix A recording the level of interaction between i and j. A desirable feature of
Assumption 3, with Gi defined as in (1), is that it allows for the existence of heterogeneous network effects.
This implies that the level of first-order interference depends on the position of the agent in the network,
and one can take into consideration both direction and intensity of the link between agents.
From this definition of the neighborhood treatment, and by virtue of Assumption 3, we are also able to
define the potential outcomes of the agents as a joint treatment of the form Yi(Zi = z,Gi = g); henceforth,
Yi(z,g). Specifically, this expression represents the potential outcome of node i under treatment z, whereby
agent i is exposed to the neighborhood treatment g through connected agents.8
2.3. Causal Estimands
Given the continuous individual treatment and the bivariate joint treatment, the potential outcome of
unit i Yi(z,g) can be seen as a dose-response function. Accordingly, we define the marginal mean of the
potential outcome Yi(z,g), for each value of z and g, as the average dose-response function (aDRF), denoted
8Here, we take a perspective that is sometimes referred to as ‘super-population’; that is, the potential outcomes are fixed
quantities and expectations are simple averages of these outcomes in the large, near-infinite, super-population G of cardinality
N (Imbens & Rubin, 2015).
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by µ(z,g). Formally, let
µ(z,g) = E[Yi(z,g)] (2)
which can be marginalized to get the univariate average dose-response functions
µZ(z) =
∫
g
E[Yi(z,g)] f (g)dg and µG(z) =
∫
E[Yi(z,g)] f (z)dz (3)
where f (g) and f (z) are the observed marginal distributions of the neighborhood and individual treatments.
The univariate average dose-response functions allow to define direct effects of the treatment as any compar-
ison δ (z,z′) = µZ(z)− µZ(z′), or as the first derivative of the average dose-response function δ (dz) = dµZ(z)dz .
Similarly, spillover effects can be defined as the difference between the average potential outcome correspond-
ing to two different levels of the neighborhood treatment g and g′: δ (g,g′) = µG(g)−µG(g′), or as the first
derivative of the average dose-response function δ (dg) = dµ
G(g)
dg .
2.4. Unconfoundedness of the Joint Treatment
To draw causal inference, the standard literature relies on the unconfoundedness assumption, which im-
plies that the treatment can be considered to be randomly assigned after accounting for agents’ differences in
a fixed set of exogenous pre-treatment characteristics (Rubin, 1990). However, in the presence of interference,
we require that both the individual and the neighborhood treatments should be unconfounded conditional
on covariates. The extension of unconfoundedness to neighborhood treatment is a crucial element of this
study because only when both treatments are considered as random is any potential confounding effect offset.
Formally, this leads to the identification of the dose-response function µ(z,g) based on the unconfoudedness
assumption of the joint treatment, which is the conditional independence between the joint treatment and
potential outcomes:
Assumption 4 (Unconfoudedness of the Joint Treatment). Conditional on the vector of covariates
Xi, the potential outcome Yi(z,g) is independent of the level of the treatments Zi and Gi:
Yi(z,g)⊥⊥ Zi,Gi |Xi ∀z,g,∀i
Assumption 4 states that for agents with the same values of covariates Xi, the distribution of a potential
outcome Yi(z,g) does not depend on the actual treatments Zi and Gi that each agent receives. Conditional
independence of Yi(z,g) essentially posits an exogeneity assumption of the joint treatment and it rules out
the presence of unmeasured factors affecting the potential outcome of an agent i and alternatively their own
treatment or the treatment received by their neighbors (see Forastiere et al. (2020) for a detailed discussion
on the plausibility of this assumption).
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2.5. Joint Propensity Score-based Estimator
To get an unbiased estimate of both the treatment and the spillover effects, we now present the JPS-based
estimator. This is modelled to correct for interference by balancing individual and neighborhood covariates
across agents under different levels of individual and neighborhood treatments.
Formally, we define a joint propensity score ψ(z;g;x) as the probability of being subject to direct treatment
z and being exposed to a weighted average of the treatments of the agent’s connections equal to g, given
characteristics Xi = x:
ψ(z;g;x) = P(Zi = z,Gi = g|Xi = x)
= P(Gi = g|Zi = z,Xi = x)P(Zi = z|Xi = x)
(4)
where λ (g;z;x) denotes the probability of neighborhood treatment at level g conditional on a specific value z
of the individual treatment and on the vector of covariates Xi (i.e., P(Gi = g|Zi = z,Xi = x)), which we refer
to as the neighborhood propensity score. Similarly, φ(z;x) denotes the probability of individual treatment at
level z conditional on covariates (i.e., P(Zi = z|Xi = x)), which we refer to as the individual propensity score.
By definition, the individual and neighborhood propensity scores are two joint balancing scores; that is,
Xi⊥⊥ Zi,Gi | φ(z;Xi),λ (g;z;Xi). This means that within strata with the same value of φ(z;Xi) and λ (g;z;Xi),
the joint probability distribution of the individual treatment Zi and the neighborhood treatment Gi does not
depend on the value of Xi. It is then straightforward to show that, given the Assumption 4 and the balancing
property of the propensity scores, the assignment to the joint treatment is unconfounded given both the
individual and the neighborhood propensity scores (i.e., Yi(z,g) ⊥⊥ Zi,Gi | φ(z;Xi),λ (g;z;Xi),∀z,g,∀i). This
result implies that any bias associated with differences in the distribution of covariates across groups with
different treatment levels can be removed by adjusting for both propensity scores.9 As an adjustment method,
we use an extended version of the model-based generalized propensity score approach (GPS) introduced by
Hirano & Imbens (2004). Thus, given the factorization of the joint propensity score into the product of the
individual propensity score and neighborhood propensity score (4), we are able to use a generalized propensity
score approach on both propensity scores to adjust for confounding covariates Xi.
As already mentioned, this approach builds on Forastiere et al. (2020), who deal with a binary individual
treatment and use a subclassification method to adjust for the individual propensity score and (within each
stratum) the model-based GPS approach to adjust for the neighborhood propensity score. With respect
to this method, our estimator is modified by replacing the subclassification on the propensity score of the
binary treatment with a second generalized propensity score for continuous treatment.
9Appendix A provides a detailed discussion of this result.
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2.6. Estimation Procedure
In what follows, we outline the estimating procedure for the average dose-response function µ(z,g).
Consider the following general models for the individual treatment Z, the neighborhood treatment G,
and the outcome Y :
Zi ∼ f Z(Xi;θZ) (5)
Gi ∼ fG(Zi,Xi;θG) (6)
Yi(z,g)∼ fY (z,g,φ(z;Xi),λ (z;g;Xi);θY ) (7)
According to the models in (5), (6), and (7), the estimation procedure requires the following steps:
1. Estimate the parameters θZ and θG of the models for the individual treatment in (5) and for the
neighborhood treatment in (6);
2. Use the estimated parameters in Step 1 to predict for each unit i ∈N the actual individual propen-
sity score Φ̂i = φ(Zi;Xi) and the actual neighborhood propensity score Λ̂i = λ (Gi;Zi;Xi); that is, the
probabilities for unit i to receive the individual treatment Zi and being exposed to the neighborhood
treatment Gi, where Zi and Gi are the values that were actually observed;
3. Estimate the parameters θY of the outcome model in (7) by using the observed data {Yi,Zi,Gi,Xi},
and the predicted propensity scores Φ̂i and Λ̂i;
4. For each level of the joint treatment (Zi = z,Gi = g), predict for each unit i ∈N the individual and
the neighborhood propensity scores corresponding to that level of the treatment (i.e., φ(z;Xi) and
λ (z;g;Xi)) and use these predicted values to impute the potential outcome Yi(z,g).
5. To estimate the average dose-response function µ(z,g), for each level of the joint treatment take the
average of the potential outcomes over all units
µ̂(z,g) =
1
N
N
∑
i=1
Ŷi(z,g)
Standard errors and 95% confidence intervals can be derived using bootstrap methods (Efron, 1979; Forastiere
et al., 2020).
3. Empirical Application
In this section, we illustrate how our methodology works in practice through an application to the
agricultural markets in the presence of spillover effects. The use of our (generalized) propensity score-based
estimator to this context is justified by two main reasons. First, policy interventions in these markets are
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not random; rather, they are driven by a series of macro-economic factors such as the country’s level of
development and agroclimatic conditions, among others. In such cases, our method allows us to assess
the impact of a policy while correcting for potential biases resulting from both treatment selection and
interference. Second, the intensity of policy interventions is highly heterogeneous – differing from country
to country and over time – and our framework provides the means to model the non-discrete nature of this
treatment.
The agricultural sector represents an ideal case study because it has been subjected to some of the
most heavy-handed governmental interventions over the last century (Anderson et al., 2010). Despite the
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) in 1994, which helped to
reduce distortions, many countries still prefer to regulate agricultural markets and subsidize farmers (Carter
and Steinbach, 2018). The reason for this is that preventing losses in a sector with a significant presence (in
terms of output, employment, etc.) may loom large in the government’s objective function (Trefler, 1993;
Freund and Ozden, 2008).10
An additional element of interest, is the dramatic level of interconnection reached by agricultural markets,
which provides an optimal environment to study interference. The emergence of the so-called agri-food global
value chains (GVCs) (Johnson & Noguera, 2017; Balie´ et al., 2018) has increased the probability of spillover
effects generated by national policy interventions11 (Gouel, 2016; Bayramoglu et al., 2018; Beckman et al.,
2018; Fajgelbaum et al., 2020), thereby challenging the way in which policy makers establish their policies.
Finally, while there is an intense debate over the effects that openness to trade in the primary sector
has had on consumers’ welfare (e.g., on income during a famine in India (Burgess and Donaldson, 2010),
on health in Mexico (Giuntella et al., 2020) and on labor market distortions (Tombe, 2015)), to the best
of our knowledge few efforts have been made to analyse the effects on food security (Magrini et al., 2017;
Allcott et al., 2019) and none of them takes spillover effects into account. Our empirical application aims
at complementing this literature by providing the first investigation on whether and how agricultural policy
interventions in a particular country impact not only food security in the country itself, but also spill over
on to commercial partners.
3.1. Data
The empirical analysis requires four sets of data: i) the treatment variable measuring the intensity of
policy interventions, ii) a set of observed country’s characteristics, iii) an outcome measuring food security,
10For instance, in Africa the agriculture sector still generates about 25% of the gross domestic product (GDP), or 50% if we
look at the broader agribusiness sector, and involves roughly 65% of the local population (Balie´ et al., 2018).
11Giordani et al. (2016) document the existence of a ”multiplier price effect” that can take place when countries impose
restricting trade measures.
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and iv) a network describing the trade relationships.
Following Anderson and Nelgen (2012a,b), here we assess the policy intensity using the Nominal Rate of
Assistance (NRA). Used in the guise of treatment, this is an estimate of direct government policy intervention,
as it measures the percentage by which these policies have raised (lowered) gross returns to farmers above
(below) what they would have been without the government’s intervention. In other words, the NRA is the
percentage by which the domestic producer price is above (or below, if negative) the border price of a like
product, net of transportation and trade margins. Therefore, NRA is pivotal to testing our methodology
in that it is a continuous measure accounting for both traditional policy instruments (e.g., tariffs, export
subsidies, and import quotas) and the additional measures untamed by the URAA (e.g., trade remedies).12
For ease of interpretation, we shift the support of the treatment (NRA + 1), which is known as Nominal
Assistance Coefficient (NAC). Therefore, for any given country, a NAC>1 signals the presence of policies
supporting the agricultural producers (and a farm-gate price above the border price) while a NAC<1 indicates
a disincentive (i.e., taxation) for the agricultural sector. Figure 1 shows that while the richest countries
are decreasing their policy support to farmers, developing countries are increasingly switching from taxing
agricultural production to applying protectionist measures, often exceeding the level of support provided by
OECD countries (Swinnen et al., 2012).13
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Figure 1: NAC values in OECD (red) and Non-OECD (blue) countries from 1990 to 2010
The characteristics selected to explain the policy intensity (i.e., set ii) are borrowed from the agricultural
and trade policy literature (Anderson et al., 2013; Magrini et al., 2017). Specifically, we consider: real per
capita GDP and total population as a proxy of the country demand and size, respectively; per-capita arable
land and the agricultural total factor productivity growth index to assess the country’s relative agricultural
12It is worth mentioning, however, that trade policies such as export bans and import tariffs account for 60% of the NRA at
the global level (Anderson et al., 2013).
13Anderson and Nelgen (2012a,b) provide a detailed explanation of the method used to develop the NRA and of the inter-
pretation of NAC.
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comparative advantage; the ratio of food imports to total exports, net food exports, and absolute (positive
and negative) percentage deviations from the trend in international food prices as a measure of country’s
access to, dependence from, and position in the global market; and the international food price volatility
index to capture country’s response to changes in price levels. Finally, we include a dummy to capture the
effect of the food crisis of 2007-08, and a set of regional dummies to control for unobservable characteristics
of African, Asian, European-transition, Latin American, and high-income countries.
Food security (i.e., set iii) is primarily measured as the level of food availability, that is the supply of
food commodities in kilo-calories per person. According to the guidelines of the Committee on World Food
Security (CFS, 2009), consumers are better off when this measure is maximized.14 As an example, Unites
States shows around 3700 per capita calorie supply in 2000, while Kenya only 2000 kcal. Alternatively, as
also suggested by the CFS (2009), we analyze food utilization as proxied by the prevalence of anemia among
children aged under five.15
Finally, the network (i.e., set iv) is built using the value of bilateral agri-food trade in each given year
(see Figure 2). The time window considered goes from 1990 to 2010. Furthermore, it is worth emphasizing
that Magrini et al. (2017), to avoid the risk of interference, exclude the countries most likely to generate
or be affected by spillover effects from the analysis (i.e., the top global exporters and importers), namely:
the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, China, Brazil, Canada, Japan
and the UK. In contrast, we keep these countries because it is our interest to account for interference.16
Consequently, we have a sample of 74 countries (see Figure B.6). Summary statistics are reported in Table
B.2. For additional information on data sources, see Table B.3 in Appendix B.
3.2. Model Setup
The general framework presented in Section 2 allows us to model the spillover effects using different
measures. For the purpose of this empirical application, we assume that the extent to which the intensity of
a policy of country j affects country i depends on the value of its bilateral agri-food exports, normalized by
the average world trade value. Consequently, equation (1) becomes:
Gi =
1
NS∑j
ai jZ j where S =
∑i∑ j ai jI(ai j 6= 0)
∑i∑ j I(ai j 6= 0)
(8)
In addition, we leverage the information provided by the observation of the network structure over time,
to obtain the square adjacency matrix A, where the generic element ai j = 0 if i and j: i) refer to the same
14Note that supply figures do not include consumption-level waste (i.e. that wasted at retail, restaurant and household levels),
and therefore represents food available for consumption at the retail level, rather than actual food intake.
15Consequently, consumers are better off when the measure of food utilization is minimized.
16In a robustness check, we also exclude from our analysis these countries.
12
Figure 2: International Trade Network in 2010. Only top five incoming flows are displayed for OECD (red) and
non-OECD (blue) countries
country, or ii) have no trade relationships at time t, or iii) indicate observations at different points in time.17
Following the estimating procedure for the average dose-response function of Section 2.6, in this empirical
application we first apply a zero-skewness Box-Cox transformation (Box and Cox, 1964) to the vector of
treatment, Z? = (Zk−1)/k,18 and assume the following normal model for Z?:
Z? ∼ N(αZ +βTZXi,σZ) (9)
where Xi contains the the set of covariates relative to agent i (i.e., Xindi ).
19 Similarly, we assume the following
model for the neighborhood treatment Gi
Gi ∼ N(αG +βTGXi +βTGZZi,σG) (10)
where Gi follows a normal distribution with mean αG+βTGXi and variance σG. Finally, we postulate a normal
model for the outcome given the propensity scores:
Yi(z,g)∼ N
(
q
(
z,g,φ(z;Xi),λ (z;g;Xi)
)
,σY
)
(11)
where q(·) is the sum of cubic polynomials and their interactions. We also include in q(·) an interaction term
between the country NAC and the network NAC. This allows the direct effect of national policies to vary
depending on the policies implemented in partner countries, and the spillover effects to vary depending on
17Note that this requires independence between observations across years, which is a common assumption in most spatial
applications (Anselin et al., 2008).
18Note that k is chosen so that the skewness of the transformed variable is zero.
19The implicit assumption is that self-selection mechanisms are only driven by the individual characteristics of the agent i
and not by the neighborhood characteristics (i.e., Xneighi is not considered). We will relax this assumption in Section (3.4).
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the country NAC.
3.3. Results
Table 1 reports the estimated parameters of the models for the individual treatment Zi (Direct NAC)
and the neighborhood treatment Gi (Network NAC). The set of covariates used in these models, i.e, Xi, are
those described in Section 3.1.
Table 1: Individual and neighborhood propensity scores
(1) (2)
Direct NAC Network NAC
φ(z;xz) (Eq. 5) φ(g;z;xg) (Eq. 6)
real pc GDP 0.038∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.686∗∗∗ (0.068)
pc arable land −0.040∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.066 (0.055)
population 0.013∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.392∗∗∗ (0.037)
agricultural productivity −0.001∗∗ (0.0003) 0.004 (0.003)
food import/total exports −0.023∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.360∗∗∗ (0.071)
net exports −0.017∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.096∗∗∗ (0.017)
positive deviation food price −0.144 (0.143) −1.842 (1.300)
negative deviation food price −0.236∗ (0.132) −2.378∗∗ (1.208)
food price volatility −2.843∗∗ (1.102) −19.944∗∗ (10.065)
food crisis −0.030∗ (0.018) −0.118 (0.160)
Z −1.139∗∗∗ (0.208)
Constant −0.430∗∗∗ (0.080) −9.787∗∗∗ (0.732)
Observations 930 930
R2 0.527 0.420
Adjusted R2 0.519 0.410
Residual Std. Error 0.126 (df = 915) 1.150 (df = 914)
F Statistic 72.728∗∗∗ (df = 14; 915) 44.066∗∗∗ (df = 15; 914)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Real pc GDP, pc arable land and population variables are in log
and one year lagged. Agricultural productivity, food import/total exports, net exports, positive deviation food price and negative
deviation food price variables are one year lagged (Source: FAOSTAT, WDI, USDA).
Propensity scores are instrumental to fit the outcome model. Nonetheless, a number of relevant insights
can be obtained by the analysis of the estimated parameters presented in this table. Take for instance column
1, which indicates the correlation between the intensity of direct policy interventions and pre-treatment
country characteristics. A country is more likely to strengthen the support to its agricultural sector when
the local demand expands, due to an increase in per capita GDP or in the population. In contrast, a country
tends to increase the taxation of revenues when it has a comparative advantage in the agricultural sector,
as measured by per capita arable land, or when it heavily relies on imports, as proxied by the variables food
import over total exports and net food exports. This also happens when positive and negative deviations
of international prices from their trend and high level of food price volatility occur, suggesting that when
prices spike, governments tend to reduce the support to their domestic markets by imposing restrictions on
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exports and lowering protection on imports. This is also confirmed by the negative and significant coefficient
on food crisis.
Now consider column 2, which describes instead the correlation between the country i characteristics
and the (weighted average) intensity of policies implemented by its commercial partners. We observe that
partner countries tend to provide a high support to their own agricultural sector when the country i features
a large local demand or it increases its reliance on imports. In contrast, they reduce the level of support when
trading with partners who experience price volatility. Finally, we observe that the direct NAC is negatively
correlated with the network NAC, which suggests that, country characteristics being held constant, the
higher the level of support in the country i the lower will be that of partner countries.
Following Steps 2 and 3 of the methodology, we predict the individual and neighborhood propensity
scores. These are then used to estimate the conditional expectation of the outcome given by the model (7).20
The estimated coefficients are reported in Table B.5 in the Appendix B. We then obtain the dose-response
functions by following Steps 4 and 5. That is, we first predict the probability of observing each pair of values
of the direct NAC (z) and network NAC (g), and we then use the individual and neighborhood propensity
scores to predict the country-level outcomes corresponding to Yi(z,g). Finally, we obtain the dose-response
function by averaging these potential outcomes across all countries.
Figure 3 reports the marginal aDRF for the food availability outcome when neglecting interference (i.e.,
when we do not include either the network NAC or the neighborhood propensity score in the outcome model).
The figure shows that the highest level of food availability is registered when NAC is about 48% (i.e., when
governments provide a limited support to the price received by their agricultural producers). Moreover,
marginal benefits are also obtained when NAC values range from 0.9 to 1.48, that is when the response
function is increasing. In contrast, negative effects are produced in cases of strong incentives (i.e., NAC
higher than 1.48) or high taxation (i.e., NAC lower than 0.9). This suggests that: i) in line with Anderson
et al. (2013), taxing agricultural producers to obtain additional resources to be invested in more dynamic
sectors comes at a cost of lower food availability21; and ii) a strong support of the primary sector may result
in a protection of inefficient domestic producers or crop varieties (Tombe, 2015).
Similarly, Figure 4 displays the marginal aDRF µZ(z) (left-hand panel) and µG(z) (right-hand panel)
when interference is taken into account. By comparing this response function with that of Figure 3 (and
the relative coefficients of the two outcome models (Tables B.5 columns 1 and 2), we obtain meaningful
20Since we make use of nonlinear functions of the individual and network NAC, model (7) implies a nonlinear functional form
on the direct and network NAC.
21Anderson et al. (2013) shows that taxation affects both producers and consumers. For producers, it reduces both profits
and incentives to respond to market signals. For consumers, if taxation discourages farming activity, then it can negatively
affect both demand for farm labor and wages for unskilled workers in farm and non-farm jobs.
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Figure 3: Dose-response function E[Yi(z)] of direct NAC on food availability (log scale) w/o interference
information on the extent and direction of the bias when neglecting spillover effects.
Specifically, we observe that when ignoring interference, the impact of national policies (φ(z;Xzi )) is
overestimated by about 30%. The left-hand panel of Figure 4, which represents the aDRF of the direct
NAC µZ(z) when interference is taken into account and marginalized over, shows that the highest benefit
in terms of food supply is registered when NAC value is equal to 1.78. This suggests that domestic policies
may require additional efforts if they are to be effective in an interconnected world.
In addition, the dose-response estimator allows us to assess the spillover effects of policy interventions in
partner countries. The right-hand panel of Figure 4, representing the average dose-response function of the
network NAC µG(g), shows that as a result of the emergence of agri-food GVCs, it is crucial to take into
account commercial partner policies when determining the optimal level of a domestic intervention because
they can either boost or counteract the effect of local measures. Specifically, high levels of domestic food
availability are reached when trading partners provide incentives to their own agricultural producers, as
shown by the increasing aDRF. This is straightforward bearing in mind that producer support may boost
exports and therefore food availability in the importing country i.
The effect of the correlation between domestic and foreign policies — as mediated by the trade network
— is clearer when we look at Figure 5, which represents the bivariate aDRF µ(z,g). Even when governments
are able to maximize their objective functions and reach the highest level possible of welfare, the intensity
of policies implemented in partner countries may still push the supply of food far from the desired level.
3.4. Robustness Checks
In Section 2 we show that when the selection of neighborhood treatment is driven by the characteristics of
both the agent and the network, unconfoundedness may be achieved through a decomposition of the vector
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Figure 4: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left-hand) and marginal dose-response
function µG(z) of network NAC (right-hand) on food availability (log scale) with interference
Figure 5: Average dose-response function µ(z,g) of direct NAC and network NAC on food availability (log
scale) with interference
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Xi into two subvectors encompassing individual and neighborhood chracteristics. While in the previous
analysis we made use of only the former type of covariates, in this section we introduce a specific network-
level variable, namely the weighted average real per capita GDP of the networkNi. Table B.6 in Appendix B
reports the estimated parameters of the models for the individual and the neighborhood treatments when
including this additional covariate. The results are in line with our baseline specification and further show
that network real per capita GDP is negatively correlated with the direct NAC and positively associated
with the network NAC.22 Moreover, we find that the outcome model still confirms our main results (Table
B.7, Appendix B), although with wider confidence intervals for both aDRFs and a lower maximum point for
µG(z) (1.61) (Figure B.7).
Further, we check whether our results are robust to sample composition. First, we re-run our baseline
model excluding the main global exporters and importers, namely the United States, Germany, France,
Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Belgium, China, Brazil, Canada, Japan and the UK, to check whether these
are indeed the countries more responsible for spillover effects. As expected, the results reported in Tables
B.8, B.9 in Appendix B and in Figure B.8 show no point of maximum in the considered NAC range and
a no longer increasing aDRF of the network NAC µG(g) (right-hand panel). This corroborates our main
findings, whereby agricultural policies implemented by large global players have a strong influence over the
food security of their trade partners and, accordingly, cannot be ignored when assessing the effectiveness of
policies.
Finally, we make use of an alternative proxy for food security, i.e. food utilization. Measured as the
prevalence of anemia among children aged under five, consumers are better off when this measure is min-
imized. Table B.2 in Appendix B reports the coefficients of the four outcome models so far analyzed. A
low level of intervention (i.e., when NAC is about 1.4) is still conducive of high consumer welfare (Figure
B.9). But again this optimal level of support is underestimated when considering interference, as the min-
imum point moves from 1.4 to 1.6 (Figure B.10). Similar results are also obtained when we introduce the
neighborhood-level characteristic, and when excluding top global exporters and importers from the analysis,
as reported in Figure B.12 and Figure B.13, respectively.
4. Conclusions
Causal inference in observational studies has often neglected the presence of interference, which has
proven to be pervasive in many economic and social contexts. By developing a JPS estimator extended
to the case of continuous treatment, this paper provides a methodology to evaluate policies when spillover
22The goodness of fit of the Network NAC model clearly improves when including this additional covariate, as it explains
most of the variability of the Gi variable, the network NAC.
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effects matter. Specifically, we develop a generalized propensity score-base estimator that corrects for the
bias resulting from both treatment selection and continuous treatment interference, balancing individual
and neighborhood covariates across units under different levels of individual treatment and of exposure to
neighbors’ treatment.
The empirical relevance of our methodology is illustrated through the assessment of the effects of agricul-
tural policies on food security. On the one hand, our results show that policy interventions matter and they
have a non-linear impact on food security. In particular, both a local excessive taxation and support for the
primary sector are detrimental for food availability. On the other hand, the average direct effect estimated
neglecting interference underestimates the optimal level of producers’ support.
The correlation between local and foreign policies — as mediated by the trade network — points to
new directions of research and it may provide interesting insights to assess the indirect effects of policy
changes. This is, for instance, the case of the Single Farm Payment implemented in 2003 under the Common
Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU), which consisted in detaching farmers’ income payments
from the production of specific crops to increase the flexibility of farm decision making and ultimately reduce
the level of EU intervention. It is also the case of the currently restrictions policy measures implemented by
some countries in order to ensure adequate domestic supplies and shield their consumers from price volatility
during the highly debated COVID-19 crisis. The framework provided in this paper might contribute to an
assessment of the indirect consequences of these policies on partner countries.
However, even though this paper makes a concrete step forward in causal inference studies accounting
for network structures, a serious limitation lies in the assumption that limits spillover effects to first-order
network neighbors. While this is common in the literature, the plausible presence of higher-order interference
might bias the estimates of both direct and first-order spillover effects. Finally, the bootstrap procedure that
we employ in our empirical application relies on an independent sampling strategy with replacement, which is
only appropriate if the analyst can rule out the presence of a residual correlation between potential outcomes
of partner countries after conditioning for covariates. Clustering at the geographical level or by employing a
community detection algorithm (see Forastiere et al. (2019)) would be a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix A. Balance Check
In Section 2.5 we described the balancing property of the propensity scores; that is, the fact that the
covariates Xi are balanced across levels of the joint treatment within strata defined by the values of both
propensity scores φ(z;Xi) and λ (z;g;Xi). As long as the estimated propensity scores satisfy this property,
the proposed adjustment method ensures unbiased estimates of the causal estimands of interest. Therefore,
this balancing property can be employed to empirically assess the adequacy of the estimated propensity
scores.
With a binary treatment, this balance check is usually conducted by comparing the distribution of
covariates between treated and control units within strata defined by the propensity scores (Rosenbaum &
Rubin, 1983). With a continuous treatment, Hirano & Imbens (2004) propose to first divide the levels of the
treatment into intervals and, within these, stratify individuals into groups according to the median values
(of the corresponding interval) of the generalized propensity score. Then, it is possible to test whether the
observed covariates are balanced within these GPS strata. Unfortunately, in our framework each unit is
affected by two different continuous treatments and a similar approach seems to be unfeasible.
However, we may implement a regression-based approach as in Flores et al. (2012). We first check the
balancing property of both the individual and neighborhood propensity scores. This is done by regressing
each covariate on the two treatments with and without the generalized propensity scores and then comparing
the coefficients of the treatments. A likelihood ratio (LR) test can compare the two models and check whether
conditional on the GPS, the covariates have little explanatory power. If so, they are sufficiently balanced by
the GPS. Finally, to check for the balancing property of each propensity score, we split the balance check into
two steps. The first step checks the balancing property of the individual propensity score φ(z;Xi), through
a comparison of models for the individual treatment Zi given the individual propensity score φ(z;Xi) with
and without covariates. In the second step, we check the balancing property of the neighborhood propensity
score λ (z;g;Xi) by comparing a model for the neighborhood treatment Gi given the individual treatment
and the neighborhood propensity score λ (z;g;Xi) with and without covariates.
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Appendix B. Figures and Tables
Figure B.6: Map of the World. Countries included in the sample are indicated by the color grey.
Table B.2: Summary statistics of outcomes, covariates, treatment and network variables
Variable Mean St. Dev. Max Min
Outcomes
food availability 2,772.66 453.82 3,522 2,046
food utilization 36.08 22.15 79.00 10.50
Covariates
real pc GDP 13,883.05 18,126.58 91,617.28 302.13
pc arable land 0.32 0.39 2.81 0.03
population (/100) 680,600.84 1,585,192.15 12,309,806.91 3,174.14
agriculture productivity 113.28 15.97 180.44 83.47
food import/total exports 0.13 0.18 1.94 0.01
net exports 1.66 2.38 24.61 0.00
positive deviation food price 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.00
negative deviation food price 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.00
food price volatility 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
food crisis 0.10 0.29 1.00 0.00
Treatment NAC (Z) 1.14 0.26 2.21 0.77
Network Trade value 0.92 1.50 10.27 0.00
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Table B.4: NAC distribution by country
Country Mean St. Dev. Max Min Country Mean St. Dev. Max Min
ARG 0.87 0.11 1.00 0.70 KEN 1.01 0.09 1.16 0.69
AUS 1.02 0.02 1.06 1.00 KOR 2.28 0.35 2.78 1.52
AUT 1.42 0.23 1.82 1.07 LKA 1.03 0.11 1.19 0.85
BEL 1.30 0.12 1.54 1.10 LTU 1.16 0.26 1.65 0.55
BEN 0.99 0.02 1.01 0.93 LVA 1.18 0.27 1.73 0.55
BFA 0.98 0.03 1.02 0.90 MAR 1.65 0.15 1.98 1.45
BGD 0.93 0.12 1.06 0.63 MDG 1.00 0.10 1.24 0.90
BGR 0.95 0.14 1.18 0.64 MEX 1.14 0.13 1.41 0.85
BRA 1.01 0.09 1.11 0.80 MLI 0.98 0.02 1.02 0.94
CAN 1.21 0.09 1.43 1.08 MOZ 1.04 0.06 1.24 0.95
CHE 2.77 0.83 4.32 1.48 MYS 0.99 0.05 1.06 0.87
CHL 1.07 0.03 1.10 1.01 NGA 1.00 0.08 1.22 0.87
CHN 1.03 0.13 1.27 0.71 NIC 0.90 0.08 1.05 0.73
CIV 0.76 0.05 0.82 0.68 NLD 1.39 0.17 1.62 1.08
CMR 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.96 NOR 2.68 0.61 3.67 1.63
COL 1.17 0.10 1.34 0.96 NZL 1.02 0.01 1.06 1.00
CZE 1.21 0.12 1.48 1.07 PAK 0.96 0.08 1.12 0.78
DEU 1.39 0.20 1.79 1.07 PHL 1.19 0.14 1.41 0.87
DNK 1.34 0.18 1.70 1.06 POL 1.18 0.14 1.60 0.98
DOM 1.07 0.15 1.43 0.76 PRT 1.27 0.11 1.44 1.08
ECU 0.93 0.14 1.22 0.70 RUS 1.14 0.19 1.42 0.55
EGY 0.97 0.07 1.10 0.84 SDN 0.82 0.29 1.47 0.31
ESP 1.28 0.14 1.56 1.08 SEN 0.98 0.12 1.23 0.83
EST 1.10 0.18 1.41 0.62 SVK 1.24 0.12 1.43 1.07
ETH 0.86 0.19 1.27 0.50 SVN 1.56 0.29 2.06 1.09
FIN 1.58 0.47 2.54 1.07 SWE 1.46 0.30 2.13 1.07
FRA 1.37 0.22 1.88 1.06 TCD 0.99 0.01 1.01 0.96
GBR 1.42 0.21 1.88 1.09 TGO 0.98 0.02 1.00 0.93
GHA 0.98 0.03 1.05 0.92 THA 1.00 0.06 1.14 0.90
HUN 1.20 0.12 1.45 1.07 TUR 1.25 0.11 1.43 1.01
IDN 1.01 0.11 1.20 0.78 TZA 0.85 0.15 1.12 0.50
IND 1.08 0.11 1.26 0.88 UGA 0.96 0.08 1.02 0.76
IRL 1.57 0.26 2.05 1.08 UKR 0.93 0.15 1.13 0.54
ISL 2.76 0.86 4.94 1.62 USA 1.12 0.04 1.18 1.04
ITA 1.29 0.15 1.57 1.07 ZAF 1.05 0.07 1.21 0.93
JPN 2.08 0.25 2.72 1.68 ZMB 0.94 0.00 0.94 0.94
VNM 1.13 0.15 1.32 0.88
Notes: Country names are denoted using ISO3 Code.
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Table B.5: Outcome models
(1) (2)
Food Availability Food Availability
(w/o interference) (with interference)
z 2.042∗∗ (0.813) 0.523 (0.664)
z2 −0.970 (0.591) 0.057 (0.486)
z3 0.095 (0.136) −0.087 (0.113)
φ(z;Xzi ) −0.246∗∗∗ (0.078) −0.132∗∗ (0.061)
φ(z;Xzi )
2 0.046 (0.046) 0.039 (0.036)
φ(z;Xzi )
3 −0.010 (0.008) −0.006 (0.007)
z∗φ(z;Xzi ) 0.145∗∗∗ (0.019) 0.028∗ (0.016)
g 0.107∗∗∗ (0.028)
g2 −0.021∗∗∗ (0.006)
g3 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005)
λ (g;z;Xgi ) 0.265 (0.772))
λ (g;z;Xgi )
2 −1.181 (3.792)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
3 −3.095 (5.902)
g∗λ (g;z;Xgi ) 0.192∗∗∗ (0.047)
z∗g −0.036∗∗∗ (0.013)
Constant 6.834∗∗∗ (0.342) 7.545∗∗∗ (0.281)
Observations 930 930
R2 0.358 0.617
Adjusted R2 0.353 0.610
Residual Std. Error 0.134 (df = 922) 0.104 (df = 914)
F Statistic 73.333∗∗∗ (df = 7; 922)98.015∗∗∗ (df = 15; 914)
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Table B.6: Individual and neighborhood propensity scores with neighborhood-level covariates
(1) (2)
Direct NAC Network NAC
φ(z;xz) (Eq. 5) φ(g;z;xg) (Eq. 6)
real pc GDP 0.047∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.038∗∗∗ (0.011)
pc arable land −0.040∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.043∗∗∗ (0.009)
population 0.019∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.005 (0.006)
agricultural productivity −0.001∗∗ (0.0003) −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005)
food import/total exports −0.016∗∗ (0.008) 0.028∗∗ (0.011)
net exports −0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.006∗∗ (0.003)
positive deviation food price −0.160 (0.141) −0.593∗∗∗ (0.207)
negative deviation food price −0.262∗∗ (0.131) −0.383∗∗ (0.193)
food volatility −3.034∗∗∗ (1.091) −3.933∗∗ (1.604)
food crisis −0.030∗ (0.017) −0.061∗∗ (0.025)
Network real pc GDP −0.002∗∗∗ (0.0005) 0.132∗∗∗ (0.001)
Z 0.198∗∗∗ (0.034)
Constant −0.598∗∗∗ (0.087) −0.188 (0.127)
Observations 930 930
R2 0.538 0.985
Adjusted R2 0.530 0.985
Residual Std. Error 0.125 (df = 914) 0.183 (df = 913)
F Statistic 70.849∗∗∗ (df = 15; 914) 3,829.031∗∗∗ (df = 16; 913)
Regional dummies Yes Yes
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Real pc GDP, pc arable land, population variables and network real
pc GDP are in log and one year lagged. Agricultural productivity, food import/total exports, net exports, positive deviation food
price and negative deviation food price variables are one year lagged (Source: FAOSTAT, WDI, USDA).
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Table B.7: Outcome model with neighborhood-level covariates
(1)
Food Availability
z 1.338∗ (0.718)
z2 −0.560 (0.525)
z3 0.032 (0.122)
φ(z;Xzi ) −0.134∗∗ (0.064)
φ(z;Xzi )
2 −0.031 (0.038)
φ(z;Xzi )
3 0.006 (0.007)
z∗φ(z;Xzi ) 0.123∗∗∗ (0.018)
g 0.187∗∗∗ (0.023)
g2 −0.025∗∗∗ (0.005)
g3 0.002∗∗∗ (0.0004)
λ (g;z;Xgi ) −0.061 (0.126)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
2 0.051 (0.099)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
3 −0.019 (0.025)
g∗λ (g;z;Xgi ) 0.007 (0.007)
z∗g −0.068∗∗∗ (0.014)
Constant 7.174∗∗∗ (0.311)
Observations 930
R2 0.542
Adjusted R2 0.535
Residual Std. Error 0.113 (df = 914)
F Statistic 72.185∗∗∗ (df = 15; 914)
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Figure B.7: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left) and marginal dose-response function
µG(z) of network NAC (right) on food availability (log scale) with neighborhood-level covariates
31
Table B.8: Individual and neighborhood propensity scores excluding main exporter and importer countries
(1) (2)
Direct NAC Network NAC
φ(z;xz) (Eq. 5) φ(g;z;xg) (Eq. 6)
real pc GDP 0.024∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.537∗∗∗ (0.041)
pc arable land −0.031∗∗∗ (0.007) 0.374∗∗∗ (0.036)
population 0.010∗ (0.005) 0.097∗∗∗ (0.025)
agricultural productivity −0.0001 (0.0004) 0.009∗∗∗ (0.002)
food import/total exports −0.022∗∗∗ (0.008) 0.100∗∗ (0.041)
net exports −0.015∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.087∗∗∗ (0.009)
positive deviation food price −0.063 (0.164) 0.012 (0.792)
negative deviation food price −0.158 (0.152) −0.835 (0.732)
food volatility −3.660∗∗∗ (1.272) −11.673∗ (6.160)
food crisis −0.029 (0.021) 0.069 (0.099)
Z −0.734∗∗∗ (0.125)
Constant −0.335∗∗∗ (0.104) −4.777∗∗∗ (0.509)
Observations 777 777
R2 0.374 0.635
Adjusted R2 0.362 0.628
Residual Std. Error 0.130 (df = 762) 0.628 (df = 761)
F Statistic 32.460∗∗∗ (df = 14; 762) 88.249∗∗∗ (df = 15; 761)
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Real pc GDP, pc arable land and population variables are in log
and one year lagged. Agricultural productivity, food import/total exports, net exports, positive deviation food price and negative
deviation food price variables are one year lagged (Source: FAOSTAT, WDI, USDA).
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Table B.9: Outcome model excluding main exporter and importer countries
(1)
Food Availability
z 0.130 (0.858)
z2 0.302 (0.629)
z3 −0.137 (0.144)
φ(z;Xzi ) −0.104 (0.077)
φ(z;Xzi )
2 −0.021 (0.048)
φ(z;Xzi )
3 0.005 (0.009)
z∗φ(z;Xzi ) 0.096∗∗∗ (0.021)
g 0.137∗∗∗ (0.050)
g2 −0.040∗∗ (0.018)
g3 0.007∗∗∗ (0.003)
λ (g;z;Xgi ) −0.257 (0.385)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
2 −1.539 (1.089)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
3 2.359∗∗ (0.966)
g∗λ (g;z;Xgi ) 0.196∗∗∗ (0.033)
z∗g −0.104∗∗∗ (0.030)
Constant 7.749∗∗∗ (0.359)
Observations 777
R2 0.435
Adjusted R2 0.424
Residual Std. Error 0.118 (df = 761)
F Statistic 39.076∗∗∗ (df = 15; 761)
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Figure B.8: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left) and marginal dose-response function
µG(z) of network NAC (right) on food availability (log scale) excluding main exporter and importer countries
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Table B.10: Food utilization outcome models
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Food Utilization Food Utilization Food Utilization Food Utilization
(w/o interference) (with interference) (with neighborhood-level (excluding main
covariates) exp imp countries)
z −4.768 (2.975) 1.119 (2.428) −1.285 (2.479) −2.305 (2.620)
z2 2.154 (2.193) −1.858 (1.807) 0.088 (1.844) 1.031 (1.965)
z3 −0.107 (0.510) 0.670 (0.424) 0.202 (0.432) −0.070 (0.462)
φ(z;Xzi ) 0.428 (0.285) 0.026 (0.222) 0.111 (0.224) 0.563
∗∗ (0.255)
φ(z;Xzi )
2 0.092 (0.176) 0.263∗ (0.136) 0.304∗∗ (0.138) 0.214 (0.167)
φ(z;Xzi )
3 0.015 (0.033) −0.035 (0.026) −0.039 (0.026) −0.033 (0.033)
z∗φ(z;Xzi ) −0.795∗∗∗ (0.074) −0.504∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.671∗∗∗ (0.065) −0.865∗∗∗ (0.075)
g −0.810∗∗∗ (0.098) −0.957∗∗∗ (0.088) −0.207 (0.154)
g2 0.149∗∗∗ (0.025) 0.135∗∗∗ (0.020) −0.068 (0.048)
g3 −0.012∗∗∗ (0.002) −0.010∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.001 (0.007)
λ (g;z;Xgi ) −4.660∗ (2.680) 0.125 (0.305) −0.324 (1.439)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
2 37.926∗∗∗ (14.551) 0.063 (0.231) 8.812∗∗ (4.342)
λ (g;z;Xgi )
3 −62.926∗∗∗ (24.362) −0.030 (0.054) −12.310∗∗∗ (4.173)
g∗λ (g;z;Xgi ) −0.376∗∗ (0.172) −0.010 (0.020) −0.822∗∗∗ (0.123
z∗g 0.225∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.321∗∗∗ (0.046) 0.442∗∗∗ (0.091)
Constant 6.390∗∗∗ (1.235) 3.813∗∗∗ (1.023) 4.772∗∗∗ (1.044) 4.785∗∗∗ (1.093)
Observations 952 952 952 786
R2 0.442 0.673 0.665 0.564
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.668 0.650 0.555
Residual Std. Error 0.501 (df = 944) 0.385 (df = 936) 0.395 (df = 936) 0.387 (df = 770)
F Statistic 106.934∗∗∗ (df = 7; 944)128.644∗∗∗ (df = 15; 936) 118.692∗∗∗ (df = 15; 936) 66.375∗∗∗ (df = 15; 770)
Notes: Significance levels: * p< 0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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Figure B.9: Dose-response function E[Yi(z)] of direct NAC on food utilization (log scale) w/o interference
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Figure B.10: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left) and marginal dose-response function
µG(z) of network NAC (right) on food utilization (log scale) with interference
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Figure B.11: Average dose-response function µ(z,g) of direct NAC and network NAC on food utilization
(log scale)
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Figure B.12: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left) and marginal dose-response function
µG(z) of network NAC (right) on food utilization (log scale) with neighborhood-level covariates
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Figure B.13: Marginal dose-response function µZ(g) of direct NAC (left) and marginal dose-response function
µG(z) of network NAC (right) on food utilization (log scale) excluding main exporter and importer countries
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